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We should cherish metaphysics for its power to overcome false views and yet we 
admonish it for its ongoing failure. Is it possible that this is for the embarrassingly 
simple reason that we usually ignore Aristotle’s definition for a true contradictory 
pair and so infect our calculations with errors? 
This casual but hopefully not unrigorous essay proposes that most of us make a 
logical mistake when we do metaphysics.  It suggests that this common mistake is the 
reason for the philosophical confusion that besets the western tradition of 
philosophical thought, and that it would be only when we make this mistake that we 
are forced to see western metaphysics as a failure rather than a resounding success. 
It would be a simple mistake and easily made, but it would have profound and far-
reaching consequences. As an example of how profound these consequences may be 
the logical scheme of the Buddhist philosopher Nagarjuna is discussed.  This 
mistake may be the original source of the view that Nagarjuna’s philosophy, and 
therefore mysticism as a whole, contradicts logic and reason, thus the reason why 
this solution for metaphysics is seen as illegitimate by many ‘rational’ philosophers. 
The essay will seem heretical wherever this mistake is made. This would be because 
once it is corrected metaphysics becomes a reliable way to work out that according to 
reason Buddhist doctrine must be true. Any attempt to draw attention to this error is 
thus bound to become an argument for mysticism and, wherever his mistake is made, 
this will be assumed to be an emotional appeal and contrary to logic. Nevertheless, 
the question in the title can be answered as a matter of ordinary everyday logic 
without reference to the implications of the analysis for religion or our view of the 
world. 
A mistake? Surely not. Well, you decide. The mistake would be basic, foundational, 
and in most areas of life would not matter at all. It would be a slight 
misinterpretation of the laws of logic as described by Aristotle and thus a tendency to 
reach incorrect conclusions by the use of reason. 
We would expect nearly all philosophers to understand Aristotle’s laws of logic well 
enough, especially since these laws are supposed to be no more than a formalisation 
and idealisation of the method by which we usually and naturally reason. Yet the 
regular misapplication of these laws leads to all sorts of problems in philosophy. 
There is a lack of clarity as to the precise definition of the contradictory and 
complementary pair of propositions usually denoted ‘A’ and ‘not-A’, the dialectical 
pair to which Aristotle’s three laws would apply, and thus a tendency to misapply the 
laws. 
When we come across problems such as Mind/Matter or Existence/non-Existence 
we usually assume that these theories, being complementary and contradictory, can 
be treated as A and not-A for the dialectic, thus that one or the other theory must be 
true. Either Mind or Matter must be fundamental, such that either a mental or 
corporeal phenomenon is fundamental, or the universe would break the laws of 
thought and would be paradoxical. We usually see all metaphysical dualities in the 
same way, be it freewill/determinism, externalism/internalism, 
eternalism/presentism, Something/Nothing or one of countless other pairs. 
This assumption would be the mistake in the title. Once we make it then metaphysics 
becomes incomprehensible. Aristotle’s laws of excluded middle and non-
contradiction[i] can only be a trustworthy method for deciding logical questions 
where they are applied to a legitimate contradictory pair of dialectical 
propositions.  Are we quite sure that these pairs of opposing theories are dialectical 
contradiction in the form of A/not-A? If they are not then the laws would not 
apply.  The correct identification of such pairs would be utterly crucial for the success 
of any philosophical investigation and yet we rarely see much attention paid to the 
issue. Aristotle gives a simple definition but it is commonly overlooked, and perhaps 
it is not a coincidence that philosophical investigations are commonly failures. 
Two prominent examples of this mistake can be found in physics and mysticism. It is 
quite often thought that quantum mechanics would require a modification to 
Aristotle’s laws, usually on the basis that the behaviour of fundamental particles 
appears to break them. To many people it would appear that a ‘wave-particle’ would 
be a case of A/not-A such that an electron must be one or the other, yet it appears to 
be both or neither. The problem does not compute. The law of the excluded middle 
seems to prevent an electron being neither, the law of contradiction seems to prevent 
it being both and yet it cannot be one or the other. More often than not the blame for 
this problem is assigned either to ordinary logic, as if it is flawed as a tool for 
describing the world, as conjectured by Heisenberg, or to the paradoxical nature of 
the universe, as if a true description of the world would contradict the laws of 
thought, as conjectured by Melhuish and Priest. 
On the same basis, and it seems an unlikely coincidence, mysticism is often said to 
require the abandonment of formal dialectical logic. In a well-known case Heraclitus 
states, ‘We are and are not’, and often this is taken to be definitive evidence for the 
‘illogic’ of his worldview, for it might appear that he is proposing the existence of a 
true contradiction. Perhaps the most regularly cited evidence that mysticism would 
require the rejection of Aristotle’s ‘laws of thought’ is Nagarjuna’s famous argument 
against extreme metaphysical positions as presented in his Fundamental Wisdom of 
the Middle Way, which generalises Heraclitus approach to all metaphysical 
propositions. My proposal here is that this perceived incompatibility with the laws of 
ordinary logic would be due to an incorrect interpretation of Nagarjuna’s argument 
arising from exactly the mistake we are discussing here. I believe that Aristotle would 
have seen Nagarjuna’s argument as an object lesson in the application of his laws, 
and would have recognised immediately that it depends entirely on these laws for its 
success. 
We need not examine the details of this argument for the limited purposes of this 
essay. Nagarjuna lists all metaphysical theories that can be counter-posed with a 
contradictory theory and are thus partial or selective, and shows that they are all 
logically-absurd. This is Aristotle’s dialectic method of refutation, the same method 
that we all rely on in metaphysics. 
If we make the mistake discussed here then Nagarjuna’s solution for metaphysics will 
appear to be not a solution at all but the rejection of all logically-possible 
metaphysical theories.  His clinical and clear philosophical clarification of the 
Buddha’s doctrine is then transformed into a public declaration of 
complete ignorance. This ridiculous interpretation is more or less orthodox in 
western thought since such thinking embodies a mistake. It is what we mean by 
‘western thought’, the kind of thinking that must reject Nagarjuna for being 
‘irrational’ or ‘illogical’. 
If we do not make a mistake, however, then we will see that the idea that one or the 
other of any of these counter-posed metaphysical theories must be true is an 
assumption and no more. It may seem a reasonable but it is not necessary. We are 
assuming that these counter-posed theories can be represented as A and not-A for an 
Aristotelian logical analysis, such that we must decide between them, but we have 
not shown this to be the case and are not able to do so. 
Consider an electron. Is it a wave? Is it a particle? Neither answer would be adequate. 
We could say that it is both. This would be closer to the truth than saying it is one or 
the other and it is what we usually do. We are forced, when describing the universe at 
this level, to speak in a seemingly contradictory language. It would not be rigorous to 
say that an electron is a wave and it would not be rigorous to say that it is a particle. 
It seems that we must speak in riddles. In this case, would an electron break 
Aristotle’s rules? 
It would not be possible for Reality to break Aristotle’s rules. They make no 
prediction for ‘what is the case’. For Aristotle ‘what is the case’ would be an empirical 
matter. Nothing could go wrong for his rules. His definition for a true contradictory 
pair of propositions A and not-A states, very simply, that one of the pair must be true 
and the other false. This is all there is to the definition. If we bear this definition in 
mind when thinking about metaphysics we will not make the mistake we are 
discussing here. The profound simplicity of this issue seems to be precisely why it is 
so widely overlooked. 
Whatever is actually true or false about Reality it could not bring this definition into 
question. It is a rule for a system of thinking. Regardless of what is the case ‘out 
there’ in the world, wherever this strict rule for a true contradictory pair of 
metaphysical theories is broken the laws of dialectical logic can have nothing to say 
about which of them is true or false. They may both be true or both false and there 
may be a third, fourth or even twenty-fifth alternative theory. If an electron turns out 
to be a wave or a particle, or both, or something else entirely, then the ‘laws of 
thought’ would comfortably allow for this situation. 
Likewise with Heraclitus’ famous and seemingly paradoxical remark. If we apply the 
laws carefully then we need not, with Plato and Aristotle, who seem to have learnt of 
Heraclitus’ ideas from a talk given by a student, conclude that Heraclitus had 
abandoned his reason. When Heraclitus states, ‘We are and are not,’ there would be 
no dialectical contradiction. It is clear that he is not claiming that either half of this 
statement is true or false on its own, but, rather, that there are these two ways of 
describing our situation, neither of which would be strictly true on its own. By itself 
each of the two extreme descriptions of our situation would be inadequate to the 
truth and each would be false for this reason. The laws of logic easily allow for this 
because two half-truths would not constitute a contradiction. They will just appear 
to do so for someone who has not understood what is being said. 
It is unquestionably a difficult claim that Heraclitus makes here, and it is this claim 
that Nagarjuna generalises to all conceptual categories. It could be a lifetime 
of work to follow the implications for metaphysics and psychology. Yet it causes no 
problems in dialectic logic, and it gives us no reason to suppose that Heraclitus had 
abandoned his reason. He is saying that by reduction and metaphysically-speaking 
‘existence’ and ‘non-existence’ are not a contradictory pair. That is to say, it would 
not be the case that everything, or perhaps even anything at all, can be rigorously 
described as having only one of these attributes. 
This view is difficult but it is not a rejection of dialectical logic. It is a rejection of our 
usual idea of existence and non-existence. For mysticism these would be the two 
extreme poles of the conceptual category ‘existence’. Such conceptual distinctions 
would not be fundamental, applicable to the fundamental or legitimate for an 
ultimate view. Distinctions would be things of this world, the world of intentional 
consciousness, of space-time and subjects and objects, the world of opposites. The 
evidence would be that all theories that assign dualistic or partial attributes to the 
fundamental, that reify division and distinction, contradict our reason and fail in 
metaphysics. It would be their failure that makes the doctrine of Middle Way 
Buddhism so plausible as a solution for metaphysics, and it appears to many people 
to constitute a proof.  Or, it would make it plausible and constitute a proof just as 
long as we do not a make the mistake discussed here and misapply the laws of 
thought, for then we will end up ruling this solution out for breaking the law of non-
contradiction. 
Nagarjuna may suffer more than most philosophers from this this category-related 
mistake for it is made by many of his interpreters. Buddhist philosophy will then 
appear to be a rejection of logic and quite possibly of any coherent world-view at all. 
This does not seem a sympathetic, helpful or logically justifiable interpretation of 
Nagarjuna’s logic. 
What did Nagarjuna prove? Briefly, Nagarjuna’s second-century formal argument 
refutes all four available extreme answers to all dialectical (or ‘seemingly-dialectical’) 
metaphysical questions. Its importance would be partly dependent on whether the 
proof is valid, but its real value is the light it sheds on the philosophical 
underpinnings of the Buddha’s teachings.  Where Lao Tzu briefly states that for an 
ultimate view the ‘world as a whole’ can in no case be characterised as this as 
opposed to that, Nagarjuna is more expansive and lists all the things that the world 
as a whole, as a unified phenomenon, is not. He presents a more complex argument, 
one by which in no instance would it be correct to say that the world, when 
considered as a whole, is this or that, this and that or neither this nor that. This can 
be seen as some sort of complex four-value logical scheme, or it can be seen more 
simply as two pairs of dialectic propositions orthogonal to each other. His proof is a 
complete reduction of the categories of thought for a fundamental ontology and 
psychology. He shows that all positive or extreme metaphysical positions give rise to 
fatal contradictions. 
In this case, how could a contradiction arise in Buddhist metaphysics? Where could 
we hope to find a true contradictory pair of dialectical propositions among a 
collection of metaphysical theories that are all supposed to be false? There could be 
no such thing. Freewill and Determinism? Neither would be strictly true. Materialism 
and Idealism? Same again. Something and Nothing? Internalism and Externalism? 
Mind and Matter? Existence and non-Existence’? All would have the same solution. 
We are and are not. The solution would be general. This would be a global 
compatibilism of a very specific kind, one requiring no modification to ordinary logic 
nor any appeal to contradiction and paradox. 
These ideas would help to explain one meaning of the phrase ‘Middle Way’ in 
Buddhism, and also the reason why the perennial philosophy is sometimes referred 
to as the ‘doctrine of the mean’.  That this world-view cannot give rise to logical 
contradictions is implied by these descriptive names. In metaphysics they would 
denote an outright denial of true contradictions. It may be the central claim of 
mysticism that there are no true contradictions, since this would be exactly 
equivalent to the claim that the universe is a unity. If the universe is a unity then all 
extreme, partial, selective or positive metaphysical positions are false. In this case, 
we can view the ability of scholastic metaphysics to refute them as its chief virtue and 
the principle reason for studying it. There would be no need to apologise for 
philosophy and every reason to be proud of it. This happy situation would be the 
consequence of not making the mistake we are discussing here. 
Nagarjuna’s metaphysical argument would not break the laws of Aristotle’s logic but 
entirely depends on them. He shows that all extreme views give rise to contradictions 
and can in this way be refuted, such that they must be rejected for a rational 
worldview. If we do not reject these views in just the way that the dialectical method 
demands then this argument against logically absurd theories becomes 
pointless.  His method is ‘abduction’, defined by C. S. Peirce as ‘inference to the best 
explanation’ and also called ‘eliminative induction’. This method demands the 
abandonment of theories that can be reduced to absurdity by reference to the 
contradictions to which they give rise. By this method of elimination Nagarjuna 
shows that his philosophical scheme is the only one that survives analysis and that 
neither this scheme nor the universe it describes contains any true contradictions. 
When he refutes a metaphysical theory it is by showing that it is not logically 
possible. He rejects all such theories and this is his only justification for doing so. 
There is no hint of an ‘appeal to mysticism’ and Aristotle’s laws are fully respected. 
If logical analysis shows that all positive, partial, selective, one-sided, extreme or 
dualistic metaphysical positions are logically indefensible, meaning that they can 
refuted in the dialectic, then on what grounds can we argue that Buddhism, which 
claims that they are all false, requires the abandonment of dialectic logic? Where 
could we find a true contradictory pair among all these false metaphysical theories? 
Would not any such argument have to be based on some sort of logical error? 
If we follow Aristotle’s guidelines conscientiously then Nagarjuna’s argument can be 
read as a vindication of ordinary logic and metaphysics, a proof that logic can lead us 
to metaphysical truths. But it can only do this if we avoid making category-errors 
along the way.  The crucial issue would be that ‘A’ is not the contradictory 
complement of ‘B’ unless ‘B’ stands for ‘not-A’.  In metaphysics this means that the 
dialectical opposite of, say, Materialism is not Idealism. Rather, it is not-Materialism. 
Our tendency to see Idealism as the dialectical opposite of Materialism has some 
grounds in logic, it makes some sense, and the two conjectures can be formulated as 
precise opposites for the purposes of a legitimate dialectic debate. What we cannot 
do, however, if we are using logic properly, is to assume that either of them is true. 
This assumption is unnecessary and cannot be justified on grounds of logic. If we do 
not know that one of this pair of propositions is true and the other false, whether 
empirically or for logical reasons, then we do not know that they would form a 
legitimate contradictory pair. In this situation, when we cannot think of a third 
alternative this may not be a logical problem but a lack of imagination or to do with 
the inconceivability of the alternatives. The assumption that one of Idealism or 
Materialism must be true is an extra-logical assumption unless we can already show 
that it is not an assumption. There would be no contradiction, no breaking of the 
LEM or LNC, if we were to assume that both of these extreme metaphysical positions 
are false. Indeed, Nagarjuna shows that there would be a contradiction if either were 
true.[ii] 
In his book The Paradoxical Universe Melhuish rejects Buddhism. This is 
noteworthy and directly relevant. He sees that all partial metaphysical positions give 
rise to contradictions, as Nagarjuna demonstrates, but he cannot see how to abandon 
them, how to reduce them for a fundamental theory. The view that would remain 
once they are abandoned seems incomprehensible to him, and he can see no other 
option than to reify these contradictions for a paradoxical worldview, a world in 
which there would be true contradictions. The true existence of these contradictions 
would explain his personal inability to resolve them. The universe would be formally 
unreasonable and Buddhist doctrine would be false. 
This view would be an important alternative to logical positivism and it is similarly 
motivated. What Melhuish does not see, no more than did the logical positivists, is 
that the metaphysical dilemmas that seem to push him, and all of us, inexorably 
towards this paradoxical view are not true contradictory pairs of propositions 
according to Aristotle. They would be category-errors, unfair and illegitimate 
questions. It would be perfectly possible, therefore, to abandon all of the 
metaphysical positions that form the horns of these numerous dilemmas while 
maintaining a rational and reasonable worldview free of contradiction. Nagarjuna 
shows us how to do it. 
Melhuish rejects Nagarjuna, however, and ends up with a paradoxical philosophy. 
This would be a prominent example of a misuse of logic, (unless this essay is a better 
one!), and it massively confuses some fundamentally simple issues. Nagarjuna 
rejects all cases of A/not-A in metaphysics and so ends up with a perfectly reasonable 
worldview. There would be no motive for concluding that the universe is logically 
absurd. There would be no reason to suppose that Aristotle’s logical system does not 
allow for all existential possibilities. There would be no reason to suppose that 
Buddhist doctrine requires a modification to dialectic logic. There would be no 
reason to suppose that Nagarjuna was without a coherent view of his own. There 
would be every reason to suppose that his view would be very difficult to understand, 
but this would have no bearing on any logical issues. 
What we often miss, it seems to me, or at any rate I missed it for decades, is that 
while Materialism and Idealism, say, which could stand here for any pair of directly 
opposed metaphysical theories, may be formulated so as to be mirror-images, 
experience shows that they cannot be formulated so that either of this pair of images 
would work as a fundamental theory. This would be the entire problem of 
metaphysics right here, since its problems are holographic. If we think that according 
to the laws of dialectic logic one of these theories must be true and the other must be 
false then we will see this as a metaphysical paradox, ignoramibus or ‘barrier to 
knowledge’. These pessimistic terms are used all over the place in philosophy of 
mind. One of these positions must be true yet neither of them can be. This leads a 
great many philosophers to the view that there is no knowledge of the world to be 
gained in metaphysics, as if God has made it impossible for us to work out a solution 
for ontology. But if we think that one of these positions must be true then we have 
made a very important assumption that has nothing to do with logic or common 
sense. After many centuries of failing to decide this problem and others like it 
common sense would suggest that this assumption is a basic mistake and is the most 
likely reason why metaphysics so often seems to be a dead end. 
‘Dilemma’ means ‘two truths’. It is clear that Idealism and Materialism cannot form a 
dilemma if neither is true. If neither is true then other options can be considered. 
Heraclitus’ statement ‘We are and are not’ may seem to present us with a dilemma 
but we can note that Lao Tzu states that true words seem paradoxical, not that they 
actually are. They will often appear paradoxical precisely because it is common for 
people to misunderstand or forget Aristotle’s definition for a contradictory pair. 
Heraclitus will seem like madman to anyone making this mistake. Yet this is only a 
matter of interpretation. True words will not seem contradictory, just confusing, if 
the small print for Aristotle’s laws is properly taken into account. Nagarjuna’s view 
would require that we look beyond our classical concepts and, at the limit, all of our 
concepts, but not that we abandon our classical methods of logical analysis and 
certainly not our common sense. 
So, for any pair of competing metaphysical theories the question of which is true and 
which false cannot be decided in logic unless and until we know that they would 
constitute a well-formed contradictory pair. If they would not then all bets are off. If 
we ignore Aristotle and make category-errors, counter-pose conjectural theories 
incorrectly, then the output of our logical calculations will be incomprehensible, 
metaphysics will seem to be a morass of undecidable questions, an electron will 
appear to be impossible, Heraclitus will appear to be schizophrenic and Nagarjuna’s 
philosophical position will appear to be perverse. It seems possible, therefore, that 
this easy-to-make error in the application of Aristotle’s laws may be a principal cause 
of the suspicion with which so many analytically–minded philosophers view 
mysticism. Once we have made it then the idea that world is a unity beyond all 
conceptual distinctions is bound to appear logically absurd and irrational. This idea 
will now appear to be the rejection of all logically possible theories rather than all 
logically impossible ones. Worse, once we have made this assumption we find that all 
well-known and ancient metaphysical problems become intractable. There would be 
no upside, except that religion now becomes less plausible and we are left free to 
choose our pet metaphysical theories on a whim. 
This is, therefore, a mistake to be avoided at all costs. It is easy to avoid if we are 
mindful. The problem is only that when we carefully avoid this mistake the 
worldview that emerges from a logical analysis of metaphysical questions becomes 
extremely difficult to comprehend. It may not be immediately obvious that any sense 
can be made of it. This would be a psychological barrier, and it can be a significant 
one even for those who wish to endorse the resultant world-view. But we are not 
talking here about psychology or even about what is true, and not even about 
mysticism except as an example, only about a simple matter of logic. Few people 
would claim to properly understand the world-view that is endorsed in this essay, 
and certainly not its author, since such a claim would imply omniscience, yet the 
logical issue remains simple and straightforward. 
Clearly this misapplication of Aristotle’s laws has catastrophic consequences for 
Buddhism and mysticism in general. It renders Nagarjuna’s view untenable, thus 
ruling out from consideration the only known workable solution for metaphysics. It 
leads a great many people, even many of those who endorse and practice the mystic 
arts, to assume that for the Buddha’s view we would have to abandon our reason. It 
leads to the extraordinary idea that Nagarjuna refutes all possible metaphysical 
positions, as if he had no coherent view of his own. Sometimes even Buddhist 
scholars give him this interpretation. In fact he is lining up his view with a perennial 
philosophy for which ultimate reality would lie, in the words of Nicolas de Cusa, 
‘beyond the coincidence of contradictories,’ thus beyond the explanatory reach of the 
subject-predicate structure of language and the dualism required for dialectical logic. 
It would have been impossible for Nagarjuna to say more. The Tao that is eternal 
cannot be talked. All we can do is point. All we can do, that is, is identify what it is 
not by a process of abduction. 
To avoid making this basic categorical mistake in metaphysics we would need just 
one health and safety notice in the office. When faced with what seems to be a 
contradiction between a pair of metaphysical propositions, statements, conjectures, 
theses or theories, all we would need do is ask ourselves two questions: If one of 
these propositions is true then must the other be false? Must one of these 
propositions be true? If the answer to both these questions is ‘yes’ then we are facing 
a true contradictory pair and must decide it according to the rules. If the answer to 
either of these questions is ‘no’ or ‘maybe’ then all bets are off. The law of the 
excluded middle would not apply and both answers could be false. A little 
experimentation with this method shows that it is difficult to be sure that any well-
known metaphysical dilemma truly qualifies for the name and easy to see that all 
such perceived dilemmas rest on questionable assumptions. This is the reason why 
Nagarjuna’s proof will never go away in metaphysics and why the Buddha’s doctrine 
is irrefutable in the dialectic. It remains to this day the only solution for metaphysics 
that cannot be refuted other than the theory that the universe is paradoxical. 
Nagarjuna did not refute this latter idea and would probably have felt no need to do 
so even if it were possible. 
By asking these two questions we correct a mistake and metaphysics is transformed. 
We now have a subtle knife or magic sword with which to cut through all the 
problems of metaphysics. No longer can we be trapped on the horns of a thousand 
dilemmas. All the dilemmas disappear at once to be replaced by a large heap of 
unwanted partial theories all of which do not work, never have, never will, and that 
can be rejected. At last we can exit Kant’s ‘arena for mock fights’. Nagarjuna’s 
metaphysical view is revealed as the only one that is logically defensible. The results 
of logic, on the one hand, as represented by Nagarjuna, and of experience, on the 
other, as represented by the Buddha, would coincide precisely. Even Kant, who 
seems to have had less influence on current philosophy than his reputation would 
imply, would be on board. He states in the Critique that all selective conclusions 
about the world as a whole are undecidable. This could only be true if all selective 
(partial, extreme, positive) theories are logically indefensible, and in a reasonable 
universe this could only be explained, in turn, by supposing that they are all false. No 
new logical problems arise and all existing problems disappear. It is not even a very 
contentious solution. There are few philosophers who have argued with Nagarjuna 
and Kant’s metaphysical conclusion on grounds of analysis, for the two great 
philosophers only prove what we all discover. It is only ever our interpretation of 
their conclusion that varies, and this will depend critically on how we interpret and 
apply the laws of thought. 
For more real life examples of this logical mistake, the incorrect construction of 
contradictory pairs, it may only be necessary to examine the arguments of someone 
who believes that metaphysics does not produce a result and is a waste of time. 
Almost invariably, perhaps even always, this view will be found to derive from the 
category-error described here. Such a person will be somewhat baffled by the fact 
that in his metaphysical essay Appearance and Reality the English (absolute) 
idealist Francis Bradley argues for the crucial importance of metaphysics by 
demonstrating, using much the same method as Nagarjuna, that it does not endorse 
a positive result, and that this would be its most secure, repeatable and important 
result. If metaphysics did not always produce this exact same result then there would 
be no motivation for dialethism, materialism, logical positivism, objectivism, 
mysterianism, naturalistic dualism, holding our heads in our hands, concluding that 
metaphysics is useless and other such pessimistic responses to the perceived 
dilemmas of metaphysics. 
Aristotle’s careful definition for contradictory pairs means that although we might 
reject Nagarjuna’s proof of the Buddha’s doctrine for various reasons, it cannot be on 
the grounds that it would require a modification to the laws of thought or imply a 
paradoxical or ‘illogical’ universe. Nor can we accuse metaphysics of inconclusiveness 
when it is so easy to verify that it invariably reaches the same conclusion. Indeed, for 
most critics it would be their principle complaint against metaphysics that it 
invariably reaches the same conclusion. They would see this as a proof of its failure. 
They do not see that their complaint is in fact high praise, for it concedes the 
reliability of metaphysical analysis. If it still seems to them to be a criticism then it 
can only be because they have not considered that the failure of one way of thinking 
must be the success of another. 
Aristotle’s definition for a contradictory pair is: Of every contradictory pair, one 
member is true and the other false. Compare this with Nagarjuna, Bradley and 
Kant’s logical result: All extreme metaphysical positions are logically indefensible. 
The latter states that there are no irreducible dialectical contradictions in 
metaphysics, while the former states that the rules allow for this situation. As a 
hostage to fortune it can be predicted that whenever we meet what seems to us to be 
a logically intractable metaphysical dilemma it will be because we have forgotten one 
or both of these statements. If we find that in some instance that we are able to rule 
out this explanation and really do face a logical dilemma, then we will have proved 
that Buddhist doctrine disobeys the laws of classical logic. 
These discussions of logic can be arid and futile and yet everything depends on them. 
It seems inevitable that unless we can show that metaphysics, rigorously practiced, is 
a path to truth, and find a way of making it so, then we will have no method for 
reconciling religion, science and philosophy. In order for metaphysics to be useful in 
this way it would be necessary to be utterly precise in our use of logic. If we are not, if 
we make the kind of mistake discussed here, then we will be led astray by 
metaphysics and may never notice the cause of the problem. It would be my view that 
Aristotle gives us the necessary tools and Nagarjuna shows us how to use them, and 
that these two philosophers provide us with the means of reconciling the best of 
religion, metaphysics and science for a logically coherent, irrefutable, well-
developed, unproblematic, optimistic and eminently useful worldview. 
[For an authoritative and clear discussion of Aristotle’s laws and their correct 
application there is C.W.A Whittaker, Aristotle’s De Interpretatione: Contradiction 
and Dialectic. I am deeply indebted to it. There is also a directly relevant essay by 
John Corcoran, ‘Aristotle’s Prior Analytics and Boole’s Laws of Thought, History and 
Philosophy of Logic’ at http://philpapers.org/rec/CORAPA. For an uncluttered 
introduction to Nagarjuna’s Fundamental Wisdom I would recommend Khenpo 
Tsultrim Gyatso, The Sun of Wisdom, trans. Ari Goldfield, Shambala (2003).] 
 
[i] The law of non-contradiction (LNC) states that for any A it is impossible for both 
A and ~A to be true. That is to say, if the assertion ‘x is square’ is true, then the 
assertion ‘x is-not square’ cannot also be true. The law of the excluded middle (LEM) 
states that for any A it is necessary for one of A and ~A to be true. Either x is square 
or it is not, there is no third alternative. Where there is a third alternative then A and 
~A are not legitimate dialectical propositions. 
[ii] These comments would apply to Idealism only where it is a mirror-image of 
Materialism. There are forms of Idealism that stand up in logic and Nagarjuna’s view 
could be seen as one of them. ‘Absolute’ and ‘Transcendental’ are common qualifiers 
to identify non-subjective forms of Idealism. But in these forms Idealism is not 
simply the antithesis of Materialism. This is a terminological issue, of no concern 
here. The form of Idealism discussed here would be the one that Nagarjuna refutes 
and that is directly opposed to Materialism. 
 
